(1994).
531. In 1984, Congress had passed the National Cooperative Research Act, which limited
antitrust liability for research joint ventures. 532. Langlois (2006).
533. Irwin and Klenow (1996).
534. Langlois and Steinmueller (1999). 535. O’Mara (2019, p. 106).
Notes to Chapter 9 663
536. Macher, Mowery, and Hodges (1998); Lécuyer (2019).
537. Gordon Moore, “Cramming more Components onto Integrated Circuits,” Electronics, April 19, 1965. Bloom et al. (2020, p. 1116) calculate that the doubling time was actually two years—and was remarkably constant over some fifty years, representing an implied exponential rate of growth of 35 percent per year.
538. Lécuyer (2020).
539. Macher, Mowery, and Hodges (1998, p. 127).
540. Flamm (1996, p. 435). In early 1985, it took 260 yen to buy a dollar. In 1988, it took half that. 541. Kuriko Miyake, “Japanese Chip Makers Suspect Dumping by Korean Firms,” Computer-
world, October 24, 2001.
542. Langlois and Steinmueller (1999).
543. Burgelman (1994).
544. Intel Corporation Annual Report 1986, p. 2
545. Lécuyer (2019, p. 370).
546. Isaacson (2011, pp. 94–101); Hiltzik (1999, pp. 329–45).
547. Isaacson (2011, pp. 164–65).
548. Moritz (1984, p. 130).
549. John Markoff, “Apple Computers Used to Be Built in the U.S. It Was a Mess,” New York
Times, December 15, 2018.
550. I most recently heard this claim voiced by a distinguished Ivy League historian at an
international conference in 2019.
551. Andrew Pollock, “In Unusual Step, I.B.M. Buys Stake in Big Supplier of Parts,” New York
Times, December 23, 1982, p. A1. In 1982, Intel was still supplying chips for IBM’s larger comput- ers not just the PC.
552. Langlois (1997).
553. Williamson (1985, chapter 6).
554. Bresnahan, Greenstein, and Henderson (2012).
555. Carroll (1993, p. 109).
556. Windows 95, the first version of the software to offer a genuine challenge to the Mac,
was not merely a GUI on top of MS-DOS, but it still relied heavily on MS-DOS code. In the early 1990s, after the personal computer had begun destroying the minicomputer industry, Microsoft hired engineers from DEC (and from the failing IBM OS/2 project) to rewrite Windows from scratch and sever its connection to MS-DOS (Zachary 1994). The result was Windows NT, which became the basis of twenty-first-century versions of Windows. Microsoft spent $150 million on the project but was careful to give the design team free rein without corporate interference.
557. Nicholas (2019, pp. 127–31); Rifkin and Harrar (1988).
558. Baldwin and Clark (1997); Garud and Kumaraswamy (1993).
559. Bresnahan and Greenstein (1999).
560. Gerstner (2002).
561. Abbate (1999); Hafner and Lyon (1996). Over the years the agency, which I have previ-
ously referred to as DARPA, would oscillate between the acronyms ARPA and DARPA. At its founding and again now it is ARPA.
562. Abate (1999, pp. 108–9).
664 Notes to Chapter 9
563. Abate (1999, p. 186).
564. Hiltzik (1999, pp. 184–93).
565. Fishback (2007, pp. 519–20).
566. Greenstein (2015, pp. 167–68); Russell, Pelkey, and Robbins (2022).
567. Yet the victory of the TCP/IP standard does not reflect the unerring prescience and
planning of ARPA. The Defense Department simultaneously backed a competing standard, and TCP/IP emerged victorious in a protracted standards battle that involved many private as well as public players (Russell, Pelkey, and Robbins 2022).
568. Greenstein (2015, pp. 84–86).
569. Crandall (2005). At the same time, however, the Act contained pages of detailed re- quirements for how those interconnections were to be made and paid for, throwing telecom- munications into unnecessary confusion for decades.
570. Greenstein (2015, p. 49).
571. McCullough (2018, pp. 52–68).
572. Abbate (1999, pp. 214–16).
573. Vannevar Bush, “As We May Think,” The Atlantic, July 1945.
574. Abbate (1999, pp. 216–18); McCullough (2018, pp. 7–17).
575. McCullough (2018, pp. 17–37).
576. Molly Baker, “Technology Investors Fall Head over Heels for their New Love,” Wall
Street Journal, August 10, 1995.
577. Haigh (2008a, pp. 188–89).
578. Haigh (2008b).
579. McCullough (2018, pp. 108–19).
580. McCullough (2018, pp. 94–107).
581. Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Smith (2003).
582. Fields (2004, pp. 178–219).
583. Fields (2004, p. 187).
584. Baldwin and Clark (2006).
585. Fields (2004, p. 166).
586. Fine (1998).
587. Basker (2007). In 2012, the four largest big-box firms sold more than 50 percent more
than all online sales (Hortaçsu and Syverson 2015, p. 90). 588. Hausman and Leibtag (2007).
589. Blinder and Yellen (2001).
590. Kelly et al. (2018).
591. Robert Solow, “We’d Better Watch Out,” New York Times Book Review, July 12, 1987, p. 36. 592. Stiroh (2002).
593. David (1990).
594. Bresnahan and Greenstein (1996).
595. Gates (1995, p. 95).
596. Cusumano and Yoffie (1998, pp. 108–11); McCullough (2018, pp. 38–51). 597. Cusumano and Yoffie (1998, pp. 98–99).
598. Cusumano and Yoffie (1998, p. 146).
599. Cusumano and Yoffie (1998, p. 40).
Notes to Chapter 9 665
600. Lopatka and Page (1999, pp. 172–76). During this period, the government also chal- lenged, and ultimately prevented, Microsoft’s acquisition of Intuit, the maker of personal- finance software; and it initially questioned the bundling of MSN with Windows, though MSN’s lack of success made that issue moot.
601. United States v. Microsoft Corporation, Civil Action No. 98–1232 (Antitrust), complaint filed May 18, 1998, US Department of Justice, https://www.justice.gov/atr/complaint-us-v -microsoft-corp (accessed June 26, 2021). The suit was joined by the governments of 20 states and the District of Columbia. I will refer to the plaintiffs as “the government.”
602. Evans (2002, p. 7).
603. Melamed and Rubinfeld (2007, pp. 291–92).
604. For a much more careful discussion of these issues in the antitrust context, see Langlois
(2001).
605. Note that like all real barriers to entry, the applications barrier is the end traceable to a
property right: Microsoft owned
