November 14, 2016.
122. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, Electronic Frontier Foundation, https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230 (accessed October 30, 2021).
123. Nicholas Carr, “How to Fix Social Media,” The New Atlantis, Fall 2021, https://www .thenewatlantis.com/publications/how-to-fix-social-media.
124. Volokh (2021). Nadine Strossen (2018), a former president of the American Civil Liber- ties Union, has argued that Facebook and other social networks should adopt the same rules the US federal government must follow under the First Amendment, even though, like private universities, social networks are voluntary organizations not directly subject the Amendment. It is far from clear whether a private network could implement such a policy without the en- forcement mechanisms of a state.
125. Keach Hagey and Jeff Horwitz, “Facebook Tried to Make Its Platform a Healthier Place. It Got Angrier Instead,” Wall Street Journal, September 15, 2021.
126. Sam Schechner, Jeff Horwitz, and Emily Glazer, “How Facebook Hobbled Mark Zuck- erberg’s Bid to Get America Vaccinated,” Wall Street Journal, September 17, 2021.
127. Evans and Schmalensee (2016, p. 110).
672 Notes to Epilogue
128. Mark Zuckerberg, “The Internet Needs New Rules. Let’s Start in these Four Areas,” Washington Post, March 30, 2019.
129. Mandel (2017a).
130. Mandel (2017b).
131. Sebastian Herrera, “Amazon Builds Out Network to Speed Delivery, Handle Holiday
Crunch,” Wall Street Journal, November 29, 2021.
132. Mandel (2017b).
133. Khan (2017). Among the other sins: whereas most critics of the post-1970s American
corporation see a dangerous short-termism and inclination to please shareholders at the ex- pense of investment, Khan faults Amazon for suspiciously doing the opposite—investing in capacity at the expense of short-term profits. This recalls the complaint of the Dodge brothers that Henry Ford was running his enterprise as a “semi-eleemosynary institution” by setting low prices and plowing retained earnings into capacity expansion instead of maximizing short-term profits and handing them out to shareholders as dividends.
134. Khan (2017, p. 737). This assault set off alarm bells among mainstream antitrust scholars (Hovenkamp 2019, 2021; Melamed and Petit 2019; Shapiro 2018). What can it possibly mean to promote competitive markets without promoting welfare (or vice-versa)? What exactly are “our interests as workers, producers, entrepreneurs, and citizens”? How can agencies and courts decide whether those interest are being served?
135. “Memo from Chair Lina M. Khan,” Federal Trade Commission, https://www.ftc.gov /public-statements/2021/09/memo-chair-lina-m-khan-commission-staff-commissioners -regarding-vision (accessed October 31, 2021).
136. On this “Post-Chicago” approach and its relation to the original Chicago School, see for example Kobayashi and Muris (2012).
137. Wu (2018, p. 136, emphasis original). Cecilia Kang, “A Leading Critic of Big Tech Will Join the White House,” New York Times, March 5, 2021.
138. Brandeis (1913). Of course, Brandeis got many things wrong. He bought completely into the leverage fallacy, arguing in one case that the holder of a patented ice box could leverage its market power into dry ice by tying: “The owner of a patent for a product might conceivably monopolize the commerce in a large part of unpatented materials used in its manufacture. The owner of a patent for a machine might thereby secure a partial monopoly on the unpatented supplies consumed in its operation” (Carbice Corp. v. Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 31 (1931).) Indeed, Brandeis feared, the patent holder might even leverage its monopoly into ice cream. In reality, the patent almost certainly didn’t even give Carbice a monopoly over ice boxes (Hovenkamp 2005, p. 33).
139. Sandel (1996, p. 236). Bruce Yandle (1983) famously suggested that many instances of government regulation arise from the teamwork of bootleggers and Baptists. Baptists want li- quor sales on Sunday to be illegal for high-minded religious and social reasons; the bootleggers want it to be illegal for reasons of narrow self-interest. In this respect, the Romantic communi- tarian tradition has long supplied the anti–chain-store movement with its Baptists.
140. Khan (2018, p. 131). As Daniel Crane (2019) points out, the new Brandeisians—unlike Brandeis himself—appear to have no corresponding fear of autocracy in the public sphere.
141. Khan (2019, p. 981). 142. Khan (2019, p. 1016).
Notes to Epilogue 673
143. Khan (2019, p. 1080).
144. Wu (2012).
145. John D. McKinnon, “Effort to Bar Tech Companies From ‘Self-Preferencing’ Gains
Traction,” Wall Street Journal, October 15, 2021. 146. Petit (2020); Varian (2021).
147. Teece (1986).
148. Gilbert (2021, p. 12).
149. So say internal Facebook documents. Keach Hagey and Jeff Horwitz, “Facebook Tried to Make Its Platform a Healthier Place. It Got Angrier Instead,” Wall Street Journal, September 15, 2021.
150. Jin, Leccese, and Wagman (2022).
151. On the many start-ups Amazon needed to acquire and integrate for the Alexa project, see Stone (2021, pp. 21–53).
152. Phillips and Zhdanov (2013).
153. Kenney and Zysman (2019).
154. Doidge et al. (2018, p. 8).
155. Ben Worthen, Ian Sherr, and Shira Ovide, “Dell to Sell Itself for $24.4 Billion,” Wall Street Journal, February 5, 2013.
